|
a new way of looking at... philosophy >> rehabilitating kant - 4 |
- info -
|
Carse and Nelson's Rehabilitated Ethics of Care
The ethics of care is one ethical theory to come out of feminist ethics. Developed initially by Nel Noddings, it developed an ethics based around the caring relationship exemplified by the mother-child relationship. In short, the proper mode of ethics is to treat the one in need of care in the same way one would care for a child. This particular mode of ethics caused quite a stir in feminist theory as it put forward an interesting dilemma. While it captures the experience of women in the development of our morality that were ignored by contemporary theory, it seemed to also reinforce socially constructed behaviors of women as being exploitative and subordinate. Carse and Nelson set about to rehabilitate an ethics of care. One of the first concerns they address is the ease in which the caring relationship can become exploitative, which "includes no general normative constraints to regulate its force or direct it toward worthy objects" and "reinforces existing stereotypes of selfless, womanly sacrifice."17 It is calling for some sort of principle in which to guide an ethics of care from becoming self-destructive. Without some sort of principle, people could easily find themselves ending up like the giving tree. Moreover, a person could become exploited for their care. One solution for this is to subject caring to tests of some sort, though these tests can end up not being comprehensive enough. Furthermore, they characterize these tests as to "introduce the Kantian constraint that no member of a relationship be treated as a mere instrument of others."18 The most extreme examples are those relationship of great inequality, as say a parent and infant.19 I would argue that Kant does take these into consideration and that the Principle of Humanity has this built in. First, Kant stresses that it is not enough to simply not treat others as means, but to help further their own ends. In relationships in which both parties have the freedom to pursue their own ends to some degree, we are called to treat humanity, whether in ourselves or another, as an end and never as a means only. This seems to entail that not only do you treat the other as an end, but that you must also treat yourself as an end. If the relationship becomes exploitative, then you are not treating yourself as an end, and therefore must leave the relationship. If one party is grossly unequal to the other, one could apply the categorical imperative to determine whether to help that person. My bets are that in every case in which someone in need of help in an unequal relationship, the application of the categorical imperative would result in helping that person so long as you are not ruining your own ends in doing so. One would be acting from duty, and thus from a good will, then. Carse and Nelson also go on to state that the notion of respect expected "differs from the Kantian notion: people are to be valued and respected directly, as concrete, particular selves, not because they are taken universally to posses an abstract and generic capacity for rational autonomous agency."20 I don't think this statement is fair to Kant. If one is to treat someone as an end based upon their rational autonomy, which we all posses to some degree or another as human beings, then in order to further the ends of someone, you would need to consult the "concrete, particular self" in order to do as such. You are respecting them as an individual, but because they possess rational autonomy. |